IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SCOTT COUNTY
PALMER COLLEGE OF CHIROPRACTIC,
Petitioner,
v.
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
Respondent.
Case No. CVCV298255
RULING ON PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
This matter came for hearing before this Court on July 18, 2018. The petitioner, Palmer
College of Chiropractic (hereinafter “Palmer”), was represented by attorneys Diane M. Reinsch
and Alex C. Barnett. The respondent, Iowa Civil Rights Commission (hereinafter “ICRC”), was
represented by attorney Katie Fiala, Assistant Attorney General with the Civil Rights Section.
The intervener, Darren Petro (hereinafter “Petro”), was represented by attorney Jim T. Huff. The
Court has considered the arguments, the pleadings, and the applicable law and now enters the
following ruling:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Palmer seeks judicial review pursuant to Iowa Code § 17A.19 of the ICRC’s March 9,
2018 Summary Order and Notice Denying Reopening.1 This ICRC order constitutes “other
agency action,” because the decision to deny reopening of the case was agency action and not the
result of a contested case. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n v. Deere & Co., 482 N.W.2d 386, 389
(Iowa 1992). The ICRC order also constitutes final agency action pursuant to Iowa Code §
17A.19(3). Palmer’s Petition for Judicial Review was timely filed. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(3)
(a proceeding for judicial review must be commenced “within thirty days after the issuance of
the agency’s final decision”).
1 The procedural history facts are the admitted facts in Palmer’s Petition for Judicial Review.
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Palmer’s Petition for Judicial Review is properly brought in the Iowa District Court for
Scott County because Palmer’s principal place of business is in Scott County, Iowa. See Iowa
Code § 17A.19(2) (“Proceedings for judicial review shall be instituted by filing a Petition either
in Polk County District Court or in the District Court for the county in which the petitioner
resides or has his principal place of business.”).
FACTS
The court finds the following facts:
On April 25, 2014, Petro filed a complaint that the ICRC accepted and assigned as case
number CP # 04-14-65682. This complaint alleged age and disability discrimination in
education and retaliation. See Exhibit A to Palmer’s Brief. The disability Petro alleged was “I
have low back pain and physical restrictions caused by an injury from military service.” Id. On
September 18, 2014, the ICRC administratively closed this complaint.
On October 10, 2014, Petro filed a complaint with the Davenport Civil Rights
Commission. The Davenport Civil Rights Commission automatically cross-filed the complaint
with the ICRC on November 6, 2014. ICRC received the cross-filed complaint on November 6,
2014 and assigned it case number CP # 11-14-66587. This second complaint alleged age
discrimination and retaliation because of the prior civil rights complaint or “otherwise exercised
my civil rights.” See Exhibit C to Palmer’s Brief. On November 6, 2014, Petro amended his
second complaint to allege he was also discriminated against on the basis of his disability or
perceived disability and that he was subjected to unlawful retaliation after complaining about
disability discrimination. See Exhibit D to Palmer’s Brief.
On November 12, 2014, Palmer’s counsel notified the ICRC that he believed Petro’s
second complaint was duplicative of Petro’s first complaint. Deb Stewart, an ICRC staff
member, examined Petro’s second complaint and determined that it was not a duplicate
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complaint. Ms. Stewart wrote a memo confirming her finding. In this memo, Ms. Stewart stated
Petro’s second complaint was the first time he specifically alleged he was discriminated against
because of a perceived disability and retaliated against by Palmer based on his complaints of
disability or perceived disability discrimination (emphasis in the original).
On October 20, 2017, the Davenport Civil Rights Commission notified the ICRC that it
had closed the case; therefore, the ICRC did the same and closed its case. On January 29, 2018,
the ICRC issued a Right-To-Sue letter to Petro on his second complaint, CP # 11-14-66587,
pursuant to his attorney’s request. On February 27, 2018, Palmer filed a Motion to Reconsider
Issuance of Right-To-Sue Letter with the ICRC, which the ICRC denied on March 9, 2018.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is undisputed the ICRC’s decision to deny Palmer’s Motion to Reconsider its decision
to issue a Right-To-Sue letter to Petro for his second complaint is an agency action within the
meaning of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code Chapter 17A.19. The ICRC’s
issuance of a Right-To-Sue letter constitutes agency action. Ritz v. Wapello County Bd. of
Sup’rs, 595 N.W.2d 786, 792 (Iowa 1999). The ICRC order constitutes “other agency action,”
because the decision to deny reopening of the case was agency action and not the result of a
contested case. Deere & Co., 482 N.W.2d at 389. Pursuant to Iowa Code § 17A.19(10), the
district court may reverse or modify an agency’s decision if the agency’s decision is erroneous
under a ground specified in the Act and a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. The
burden of demonstrating invalidity of an agency’s action rests on the party asserting the
invalidity. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Palmer frames its two issues as follows:
1. Whether the Iowa Civil Rights Commission failed to consider an important relevant
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matter – Petitioner’s argument that Iowa Code section 216.19(6) prohibits filing of
duplicative complaints based upon the same acts or practices.
2. Whether the Iowa Civil Rights Commission’s failure to consider Iowa Code section
216.19(6) and its conclusion drawn therefrom deprives all ICRC administrative
closures of any finality and vitiates the ICRC’s administrative process, which renders
its decision unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
The ICRC denies the validity of Palmer’s issues and arguments and claims it properly
issued a Right-To-Sue letter on Petro’s second complaint pursuant to Iowa Code § 216.16(2) and
Iowa Administrative Rule 3.10 even if Petro’s second complaint was duplicative. The ICRC
further argues its decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
Petro argues the court should deny Palmer’s Petition for Judicial Review because Iowa
Code § 216.16(4) barred the ICRC from reconsidering its issuance of the January 29, 2018
Right-To-Sue letter on Petro’s second complaint. Petro’s second argument is that Deb Stewart’s
memorandum denying Palmer’s duplicative argument was final agency action and required
Palmer to file for judicial review on that decision and since Palmer did not do that, it is
foreclosed from raising it now or from raising its duplicative argument under Iowa Code §
216.19(6) in Petro’s district court discrimination lawsuit.
Palmer asserts Petro’s arguments are contrary to the law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
All parties seem to agree the decision in this case hinges on the interpretation of Ritz v.
Wapello County Bd. of Sup’rs, 595 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1999). In Ritz, the respondent challenged
the timeliness of the filing of the civil rights complaint. Id. at 788. The ICRC was not a party to
that case, but did file a successful amicus brief to the Iowa Supreme Court making the same
arguments it again makes in this case. In Ritz, respondents contended the ICRC improperly
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issued a Right-To-Sue letter because the civil rights complaint was not timely filed. Id. The
Iowa Civil Rights Act sets out conditions for the issuance of Right-To-Sue letters. See Iowa
Code § 216.16(3)(a). The ICRC promulgated an administrative rule, which sets out the
exceptions to issuing a Right-To-Sue letter. See Iowa Admin.Code r. 161-3.10(4). In Ritz, the
Iowa Supreme Court held “[T]he function of the right-to-sue letter is to certify to the district
court that the conditions precedent stated in rule 3.10(2) have been met and none of the
exceptions in rule 3.10 apply.” Ritz, 595 N.W.2d at 791. The Court went on to find that the
Right-To-Sue letter does not certify any factual aspects of the case beyond the limitations of
rule 3.10. Id., Emphasis added.
The eight circumstances permitting ICRC to refuse to issue a Right-To-Sue letter under
Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.10(1) and (4) are:
(1) No charge was ever filed;
(2) 60 days have not elapsed since filing;
(3) An ALJ has found “no probable cause” under Iowa Code § 216.15(3);
(4) A conciliation agreement has been executed under Iowa Code § 216.15;
(5) ICRC had served notice of public hearing under Iowa Code § 216.15(5);
(6) Two years had elapsed since an administrative closure by the ICRC;
(7) Untimeliness has been found under rule 3.9 or by the ALJ after an investigation;
(8) No jurisdiction has been found under rule 3.9 or by the ALJ after an investigation.
Clearly, none of these eight circumstances is present in this case as conceded by Palmer.
Despite this rule, Palmer argues the ICRC should have refused to allow Petro to file his
second discrimination complaint and refuse to issue him a Right-To-Sue letter. Palmer argues
that while the discrimination alleged in the second discrimination complaint may be a little
different than that alleged in the first discrimination complaint, the narrative Petro provided to
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both complaints is the same.2 See Exhibits C and D to Palmer’s Brief. Palmer asserts the
narratives provided illustrate the duplicative nature of Petro’s second discrimination complaint.
Palmer concludes pursuant to Iowa Code § 216.19(6), Petro is prohibited from filing this second
complaint.
As stated above in Ritz and reiterated again, issuance of the Right-To-Sue letter does not
certify that any factual allegations in the case have been proven, rather the issuance of the letter
means the conditions under rule 3.10(2) were met and no exceptions apply. Ritz, 595 N.W.2d at
791. A Right-To-Sue letter may be issued any time after 60 days of the filing as long as it does
not violate Rule 3.10(2) – (4). Often times, this Right-to-Sue letter is issued before there has
been any time for the ICRC to make any investigation of the facts, let alone any determinations.
This procedure allows for civil rights complainants to pursue their own actions in a more timely
manner in state and/or federal court after receiving a Right-To-Sue from the ICRC. If a civil
rights complainant has to wait for the ICRC to make any factual or further determinations,
evidence can become stale, if not disappear entirely. Therefore, the ICRC was authorized to
issue a second Right-To-Sue letter to Petro for his second complaint because it did not violate
Rule 3.10. Instead, the ICRC was bound by that rule to do just what it did. The court further
finds the ICRC’s decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Pursuant to this
interpretation of Ritz, with which the court agrees, the court finds Palmer’s Petition for Judicial
Review fails.
The question now is can and if so, how and when, can Palmer make an argument that
Petro’s complaint is duplicative under Iowa Code § 216.19(6)? Palmer relies heavily on its
interpretation of Iowa Code § 216.19(6) vigorously arguing that section applies and prohibits the
2 In the second discrimination complaint, Petro alleged “perceived” disability in addition to disability. In
his first complaint, he claimed disability discrimination based on low back pain and restrictions from his
military service. There was no mention of any perceived disability on the complaint itself.
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ICRC from issuing a Right-To-Sue on Petro’s second complaint because it was duplicative.
Palmer argues if Iowa Code § 216.19(6) is ignored it becomes meaningless.
The court fully accepts the ICRC’s assertion and analysis that Iowa Code § 216.19(6)
does not apply to the issuance of a Right-To-Sue letter. Again, the court finds this determination
by the ICRC is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. As asserted by the ICRC, the court
finds Iowa Code § 216.19(6) is a provision that applies to all suits brought under it and any
arguments under it are not arguments that a respondent needs to make before the ICRC, but
should be addressed directly to the court in which the discrimination action is filed. As stated in
Iowa Code § 216.19(6), the ICRC can refer a complaint to a referral agency for investigation and
resolution. Iowa Code § 216.19(8) further provides that the referral of a complaint by the ICRC
to a referral agency or by a referral agency to the ICRC shall not affect the right of a complainant
to commence an action in the district court under section 216.16. In other words, if a
complainant removes a case from the ICRC or a referral agency before a finding of probable
cause or no probable cause is made, it logically follows that the respondent can make any
arguments defending itself that it could have made in the agency process.
Therefore, Palmer was not injured until Petro received his Right-To-Sue letter and filed
his case in district court. Palmer should not and cannot lose its rights to defend itself by arguing
the duplicative nature of Petro’s complaint under Iowa Code §216.16(9) simply because the
ICRC issued a Right-To-Sue, which was issued only because it was jurisdictionally proper and
no factual determination was made. If Petro’s second complaint is found by the district court to
be duplicative of his first complaint with the ICRC, then the district court should dismiss Petro’s
pending discrimination action. In other words, the ICRC’s decision to issue the Right-To-Sue
letter was proper, even if the district court subsequently finds Petro’s second complaint is
duplicative under Iowa Code § 216.19(6). Palmer does not lose its right to pursue its duplication
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argument in the district court case, Scott County Case No. CVCV297911.
With respect to Petro’s arguments, the court agrees with Palmer and finds Petro’s
arguments are contrary to the law. Petro first argues Iowa Code § 216.16(4) bars a
reconsideration of its issuance of a Right-To-Sue letter. That section does bar the ICRC from
taking any further action on a complaint once a Right-To-Sue letter has been issued. However,
as pointed out by both Palmer and the ICRC, Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.16(2)(c)(4) provides an
exception to that section. That rule provides that the ICRC is authorized to reopen and
reconsider an administrative closure if the commission finds that the administrative closure was
substantially influenced by several grounds, one of which is “gross and material error by the
commission staff.” Moreover, Iowa Admin. r. 161-3.16(1) provides that the provisions of the
rule allowing the ICRC to reopen and reconsider an administrative closure apply only to
commission decisions and actions taken prior to the issuance of the notice of a hearing. Clearly,
the implication of this rule is that a review or reconsideration of an ICRC’s decision is permitted
to allow the ICRC to determine whether the administrative closure was substantially influenced
by several grounds, one of which is “gross and material error by the commission staff.”
Therefore, a motion to reconsider is not prohibited. Here, the motion to reconsider was properly
made. The ICRC denied the motion, which then became final agency action.
Petro’s second argument that Palmer cannot raise its Iowa Code § 216.19(6) duplicatiive
argument in the district court case, Scott County Case No. CVCV297911, because the Stewart
memo constituted final agency action is also flawed. The Stewart memo clearly constituted
intermediate agency action and not final agency action. The final agency action was the issuance
of the Right-To-Sue letter. Moreover, until the ICRC issued the Right-To-Sue on Petro’s second
ICRC complaint, Palmer was not injured by the ICRC’s refusal to dismiss Petro’s second
complaint as duplicative pursuant to Iowa Code § 216.19(6). Because Palmer was authorized to
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request the ICRC to reopen and reconsider its administrative closure of Petro’s second
complaint, Stewart’s memo was intermediate agency action and does not bar Palmer from raising
its duplicative arguments under Iowa Code § 216.19(6) in Petro’s district court case, Scott
County Case No. CVCV297911. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.16(2)(c)(4).
RULING
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Petitioner’s
Petition for Judicial Review is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Petitioner is not
foreclosed from raising its Iowa Code § 216.19(6) arguments that Petro’s ICRC complaint was
duplicative in Scott County Case No. CVCV297911.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that costs, if any, are
assessed against Petitioner.
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State of Iowa Courts
Type: OTHER ORDER
Case Number Case Title
CVCV298255 PALMER COLLEGE OF CHIROPRACTIC VS IOWA CIVIL
RIGHTS COMMISSI
So Ordered
Electronically signed on 2018-08-14 14:56:46 page 10 of 10
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